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1 Introduction 
Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) programmes in the southern African 
region emerged as a reaction to colonial ‘fortress’ conservation policies that criminalised and 
marginalised local people, preventing their use of natural resources. These colonial approaches did 
not lead to the sustainable use of the resources. They merely contributed to continued conflicts 
between government agents and local users. In the immediate post-colonial period very little was 
done to rectify these policies. It was only in the mid-1980s that a paradigm shift towards CBNRM 
began to occur. The political integration brought by the formation of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) presented favourable conditions for the scaling-up of these 
CBNRM initiatives. Transboundary natural resources management (TBNRM) projects began to be 
implemented in the joint-management of resources that straddle international boundaries.  
Objectives of the study 
The general objective of this study is to propose a TBNRM arrangement for the Mlibizi Basin of 
Lake Kariba. The justification is borne out by the fact that both Zambia and Zimbabwe have 
embraced policies that promote CBNRM and TBNRM. These ‘people-centred’ conservation 
policies have not led to the resolution of conflict in the Mlibizi Basin of Lake Kariba where fishers 
from the two countries utilise the same ecosystem under different management regimes. It will be 
the purpose of this paper to explain basis of the conflict and use examples from the existing 
TBNRMs in other natural resources such as wildlife to suggest how a similar arrangement in the 
basin can lead to an equitable and sustainable use of this contested artisanal fishery.  
Lake Kariba  
Lake Kariba, which is 277km long and covers a surface area of 5 364km2, straddles the 
Zambia/Zimbabwe border. About 45% of the water surface lies on the Zambian side and the rest is 
on the Zimbabwean side of the lake. Today it is the second largest water body, by volume, in 
Africa. The lake has five hydrological basins running from east to west. The focus of this study will 
be on the narrowest part of the lake known as the Mlibizi Basin. While artisanal fishing in the rest 
of the lake has no effect on fishers from either country, due to the deep channel between the shores, 
this is not the case in this particular basin. Not only does the Mlibizi basin exhibit riverine 
characteristics due to the influence of the Zambezi River, but it is also so narrow that artisanal 
fishers from both countries utilise the same ecosystem, albeit under different regulatory 
mechanisms. The artisanal fishing patterns for fishermen from Zambia and Zimbabwe are very 
simple because only one type of gear (the gill-net) is used. These gill-nets are set from fibre boats 
and dugout canoes, most of which are not equipped with mechanised propulsion systems.  
Management 
Lake Kariba came into being in the late 1950s following the impoundment of the Zambezi River for 
the primary purpose of generating hydro-electricity. Since this period the Zambian side of Lake 
Kariba has been under the central management of the Department of Fisheries (DoF). In 1993 the 
DoF, operating under the auspices of a donor-funded programme known as the Zambia/ Zimbabwe 
SADC Fisheries Project (ZZSFP), instituted a fisheries co-management arrangement which led to 
the decentralisation of management and the inclusion of fishers and local traditional leaders in 
structures known as zonal management committees (ZMCs) (Malasha 2002). The Zimbabwean side 
of Lake Kariba is designated as a recreation park. From a legal point of view it is controlled by the 
state through the National Parks and Wildlife Authority (NPWA). The NPWA limits access, closes 
areas to fishing and restricts fishing gear methods. A permit system is in place in terms of which the 
NPWA informs the local authorities which border the fishery of the limits placed on the number of 
fishing permits that may be issued for the particular year. In 1993 the NPWA decentralised some of 
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its management roles through the designation of exclusive fishing zones (EFZs) for artisanal fishers. 
In these zones the fishers were to determine who was to use the resource, who was to be excluded 
from the resource and how the resource was to be used (ZZSFP 1998a). 
Artisanal fishing 
On both the Zambian and Zimbabwean shores of Lake Kariba, artisanal fishing competes with other 
economic activities such as the generation of hydroelectricity, tourism and a thriving semi-industrial 
fishing industry targeting a sardine known as Kapenta (Limnothrissa miodon). From a macro-
economic perspective, artisanal fishing does not contribute as much as the other economic activities 
to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the two countries. However, artisanal fishing does affect the 
operation of these other economic activities and vice versa. On the Zimbabwean shoreline where 
there is a vibrant tourist industry, artisanal fishing is considered to have reached its limit and that 
expansion might lead to the collapse of the sector that attracts much-needed foreign currency 
(ZZSFP 1996). Both DoF and the NPWA view artisanal fishing as being ‘labour intensive, 
subsistence oriented’, and that it ‘consists of a poorly organised marketing system…having little 
management of any kind’ (ZZSFP 1998b).  
Despite these views, artisanal fishing plays an important role in the livelihoods of many households 
on both shorelines. On the Zambian shoreline artisanal fishing commenced in the late 1950s as soon 
as the water levels began to rise. In line with the existing laissez-faire policy towards the industry, 
artisanal fishers were allowed to fish anywhere along the lakeshore and own as many fishing gill-
nets as they could afford (Malasha 2003; Kolding et al. 2003). During these early years about 2 500 
fishermen were recorded as being active in the fishery, but by 1967 the number had declined to 
about 500 (Kolding et al. 2003). It was only during the 1980s that the number of fishers increased to 
the pre-1967 levels. The post-1980 increase is attributed to the contraction of the formal sector and 
a decline in industries that provided employment when the country began to implement structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs). This prompted most of the people who had lost their employment 
in the formal sector to enter (or re-enter) the fishery (Jul-Larsen 2003:233–52). Similar ‘boom and 
bust’ dynamics in the artisanal sector have also been observed on the Zimbabwean shoreline. On 
this shoreline the movements in and out of the fishery have not been as dramatic as on the Zambian 
shoreline. Kolding et al. (2003) attribute this to a good macro-economic situation which could 
afford to employ people in other non-fishing sectors. This was, however, to change in the late 1990s 
when there was a sharp increase in the number of fishermen on the Zimbabwean shoreline as a 
result of the declining macro-economic situation in the country (Songore 2000). 
The movements of fishers in and out of the fishery as a result of the changing macro-economic 
factors give an indication of the importance of the artisanal sector in the Lake Kariba fishery. 
Despite its minimal contribution to the two countries’ GDP artisanal fishing provides a safety-net 
function to thousands of households. As shown above, the contraction of the formal economy 
pushes people into the fishery thereby providing an alternative or additional source of income, 
employment and food. Largely, this is because of the low capital required for one to become an 
artisanal fisher. Secondly, the easy entry-requirements, especially on the Zambian shoreline, makes 
the fishery a perfect safety net for those who have lost their employment in other sectors of the 
economy. According to Béné (2004) artisanal fishing such as that found in Lake Kariba does not 
generate high economic returns but instead helps vulnerable households to sustain their livelihoods 
and prevent them from falling deeper into deprivation. 
Definitions and concepts 
The problem of managing natural resources has always been to harvest from a resource today in 
such a manner that it is still available to the other appropriator tomorrow. It is difficult to physically 
bar potential beneficiaries from accessing the resource. In addition, the units harvested by one 
individual will not be available to others. The best known attempt to explain this was that of the 
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‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). The assumptions behind Hardin’s view have been 
disputed. Scholars and researchers have observed that, firstly, users of a resource are not all selfish 
individuals whose primary motive is to overexploit a resource upon which their livelihoods depend, 
and secondly, there are effective institutions at the local level capable of protecting the resource 
from unsustainable exploitation (Acheson 1989:351–475). Research to identify the characteristics 
of long-lasting resource systems have been carried out by various researchers within the New 
Institutionalist School. Scholars such as Robert Netting (1976), Daniel Bromley (1992), Elinor 
Ostrom (1990), David Feeny (1994) and Fikret Berkes (1995) have sought rules governing the 
management of resources that are robust and continue to be used over a considerable period of time. 
Research revealed that these systems were not only resilient, but appropriation rules were devised 
and kept being modified over time according to a set of ‘collective choice’ and ‘constitutional 
choice’ rules (Shepsle 1989). This led to the identification of seven design principles that appeared 
to characterise such resource institutions. Ostrom (1990) defines the design principle as ‘an element 
or condition that helps account for the success of these institutions in sustaining the common-pool 
resource and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to rules in use’.  
These design principles have been influential in the formulation of CBNRM programmes in the 
southern African region. CBNRM is generally taken to refer to the devolution of control and 
management authority over communally-held resources (Murombedzi 1996). The concept itself is 
generic and refers to different government or user arrangements. CBNRM programmes are based on 
the premise that clearly-identified communities have a much greater interest in the sustainable use 
of resources than does the state or its agents or even private interests.  
The enabling political environment created by the formation of SADC provided an opportunity to 
use the experience gained from CBNRM programmes to expand these initiatives across borders. 
There was a realisation that further political and economic integration could be achieved by creating 
systems for the joint management of resources that straddled international boundaries. It was at this 
juncture that TBNRM programmes began to emerge from the success of CBNRM. TBNRM is used 
to refer to any process of co-operation across international boundaries that facilitates or improves 
the management of various natural resources to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned 
(Griffin et al. 1999). The concept is similar to the ‘ecosystem approach’ used by the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN). The ecosystem approach is a mechanism designed to balance 
conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of genetic resources (Bennett 2004).  
Principally, TBNRM promotes the management of shared ecological systems such as watersheds, 
river systems or migratory species. Through TBNRM initiatives, issues such as compliance can be 
addressed, thereby providing regulatory measures that meet the concerns of all countries concerned. 
Another strand of thought views TBNRM programmes as promoters of long-term peace and 
stability, especially in post-conflict areas. According to Roberts (www.interdisciplinary.net) the 
majority of funding in post-conflict zones is focused on human life and welfare at the expense of 
the environment. He argues that a focus on cross-border environmental concerns might even be 
more helpful. A principal feature of the TBNRMs that has been borrowed from CBNRM 
programmes is that, apart from the need to conserve the jointly-owned resources, there is also 
emphasis on the role of the market in providing revenue to an array of actors involved. 
Consequently, the formation of TBNRMs has attracted various relationship partners among 
governments, donor agencies, multilateral lending organisations and private business interests, 
especially in the tourism sector.  
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2 A critique of CBNRM and TBNRM 
CBNRM and TBNRM initiatives have been criticised at two levels. First, there is a criticism based 
on the theoretical foundation upon which they are premised. The second criticism is empirical. The 
assumption that communities that manage natural resources are homogenous and located in a well-
defined geographical space and have identical interests has received extensive disapproval. Berry 
(1993), Brosius et al. (1997) and Peters (2000) have observed that within any specific groups of 
resource-users there are other identities based on type of household, gender, village and kinship 
networks that determine access to resources. Terms such as ‘community’, ‘rights’ and ‘traditional’ 
are used generically within the CBNRM and TBNRM discourse without regard to local contests for 
power. At a more empirical level, it is increasingly being shown that CBNRMs and TBNRMs have 
not managed to eradicate poverty – one of their key goals. The continued prevalence of high 
poverty levels where most of these initiatives have been implemented have been seized upon by 
conservation lobbies, who argue that conservation and the sustainable use of a resource is a 
contradiction and cannot contribute to the eradication of poverty (Turner 2004). They propose that 
the solution is not to create community-based programmes, but to establish protected areas with the 
primary objective of conserving the biodiversity at the expense of local livelihoods. Peters (2000) 
further argues that CBNRM has not led to real decentralisation of administrative and financial 
authority and resources. Instead, local people have been further burdened by demands for labour 
and cash from their government or its agents. The role of international organisations, multilateral 
lending agencies and Western conservation organisations in the promotion of CBNRM and 
TBNRM initiatives has also come under increasing scrutiny. It is argued that more than promoting 
the use of resources for the benefit of local communities, these external forces merely shift 
resources away from local strategies for livelihoods and empowerment towards the interests of the 
foreigners which they represent (Brosius et al. 1997).  
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3 Decentralisation and community participation in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
The need to decentralise the management of natural resources in Zambia and Zimbabwe has been 
informed by three factors. First, both countries have attempted to implement policies that seek to 
reduce the poverty that is prevalent in the communal areas. The new policies seek to give priority to 
previously marginalised communities as a means of improving the conservation of resources and 
improving livelihoods. Related to this is the fact that both countries have attempted to reverse the 
discriminatory and racial manner in the way resources were accessed and used in the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial period. The third determinant has been the effects of structural adjustment 
programmes advocated by lending institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. Both countries have implemented SAPs at different times in an effort to revive their 
declining economies. This has meant reducing government expenditure and making users meet the 
full cost of accessing services and resources.  
In Zambia the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) of 1994 is founded on the principle that 
local communities and the private sector should participate in natural resource management 
(Government of the Republic of Zambia 1994). This action plan was meant to consolidate the gains 
made in the management of resources such as wildlife, in a context of declining government 
expenditure on rural development. In terms of actual implementation, the best-known CBNRM 
programme in Zambia is Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas 
(Admade). This was initiated in the wildlife sector in 1988 following an increase in the decimation 
of wildlife through poaching. Like most CBNRM programmes, Admade is premised on transferring 
the responsibilities and benefits of managing wildlife to the rural communities living in game 
management areas (GMAs) through the creation of wildlife management units (WMUs). This 
approach is aimed at reducing the cost of conserving wildlife by ensuring that benefits from trophy 
hunting are distributed fairly among members of the communities in GMAs. In 1999 the Wildlife 
Act was amended, giving communities legal rights to manage and protect their wildlife resources 
(Mwenya et al. 1990). The accomplishments of Admade led to the implementation of similar 
arrangements in the fisheries sector. It was reasoned that the decentralisation of authority to 
fishermen was the most efficient and cost-effective system of fisheries’ regulation as it promoted 
collective self-interest in sustainability (Chipungu & Moinuddin 1994). This authority was to be 
transferred to committees of users known as zonal management committees.  
Within the water sector emphasis has been on ensuring adequate delivery of the resource and 
recovery of costs rather than decentralisation. The lack of a clear policy and the multiplicity of 
institutions in water affairs led to the design of a National Water Policy in 1994. The policy sought 
to ensure the equitable provision of water for all competing users at an acceptable cost 
(www.rion.org/wwf/WDM-initiative-Zambia). It was designed at a time when the country was 
undergoing the privatisation of its public sector in conformity with the dictates of structural 
adjustment programmes. In urban areas, local authorities created commercial enterprises to supply 
water to residents at cost. This reduced the role of local authorities in directly providing water to 
residents. In peri-urban areas community-based organisations (CBOs) were formed to improve co-
ordination in the delivery of water. In rural areas water sanitation and health education (WASHE) 
programmes were implemented under the National Water Policy. The purpose of WASHE was no 
so much the management of water resources, but the enhancement of public awareness of water 
conservation.  
At a rhetorical level, efforts have also been made to decentralise the management of forests to users. 
The principle of the NEAP within the forestry sector is to encourage local community and private 
sector participation in the use of forest products. This follows numerous problems experienced in 
terms of lack of clear policy for user-participation. The 1998 Forest Policy recognised this problem 
and proponents implored the Forest Department to encourage the active involvement of local 
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communities in the protection and utilisation of forest resources, through the promotion of local 
development committees similar to those in wildlife (Government of the Republic of Zambia 1999). 
This was achieved through the Forest Act of 1999 that led to the establishment of the Zambia 
Forestry Commission. The Act further led to the establishment of joint forest management areas for 
the participation of local communities, traditional institutions and other actors in the sustainable 
management of forests. The forest management areas were to be under the control of forest 
management committees which would ensure that forests were used in a sustainable manner.  
Until recently when the Environmental Management Act (EMA) was enacted, the principal 
legislation governing the use of resources in Zimbabwe was the Natural Resources Act. The Natural 
Resources Act had a shortcoming in that it was not applicable in communal areas where tenure of 
resource is determined by traditional rights. It was through the National Environmental Policy 
(NEP) that such anomalies were corrected by consolidating the gains made in the conservation of 
resources while improving peoples’ access to them. The policy objective is to avoid a ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ by maintaining biodiversity ‘so as to sustain the long-term ability of natural 
resources to meet basic needs and to promote the participation of the public through the creation of 
effective institutional framework’ (Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe 2004). A well-
documented CBNRM programme which provided the inspiration contained in the NEP is the 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (Campfire) programme. 
Campfire seeks to encourage commercial farmers and those residing on communal lands to view 
wildlife as an economic asset that can promote both rural development and conservation (Hasler 
1996:30).  
The institutional framework of Campfire is located within local government structures. A 1982 
amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 allowed the minister responsible to confer 
‘appropriate authority’ to rural district councils (RDCs), permitting them ownership rights over 
natural resources. Benefits from Campfire projects are used to meet the infrastructural needs of 
rural communities such as schools, health centres and grinding mills. In some instances 
communities are given direct monetary incomes. The Campfire principle was soon recognised as a 
way of effectively managing aquatic resources. In 1993 the NPWA instituted a fisheries co-
management of the inshore fishery of Lake Kariba. Like other CBNRM programmes, this 
arrangement sought to confer management rights to an identified group of fishers over specific 
fishing grounds. This was borne out of the realisation that the land tenure system on the shoreline 
did not permit fishermen to have permanent homes. Consequently, fishermen resorted to all sorts of 
illegal fishing activities in order to catch the most fish within the shortest period of time (Machena 
1993). This compelled fishermen to encroach on closed fishing grounds, thereby bringing them into 
conflict with other actors, especially those within the tourist industry. To resolve these conflicts, the 
fishermen were to be given the responsibility of determining who gained access to designated 
fishing grounds or exclusive fishing zones (EFZs). Like in the wildlife sector ‘appropriate authority’ 
was to be given to fishermen operating in particular EFZs through their RDCs. This was to be a 
form of communal property regime in which user rights for the resource were to be controlled by an 
identifiable group and are not privately owned or managed by the government (ZZSFP 1998a).  
Like in the wildlife sector, changes that occurred in the water sector were informed by the need to 
alter the discriminatory colonial policies. Between 1920 and 1998 access rights to water were 
closely linked to land rights (Mtisi & Nicol 2003). Subsistence and communal farmers did not have 
rights to land, so they could not legally access water. The water sector reforms of 1998 sought to 
change this status quo by addressing the colonial injustices in water and land and the need to 
broaden the funding base in the face of dwindling government resources (Mtisi & Nicol 2003). This 
was achieved by abolishing the racial connotations associated with access to water. The 1998 
changes to the Water Act led to the creation of a parastatal known as the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA) whose responsibilities was to co-ordinate the development, management and 
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conservation of water resources. The Act further democratised and decentralised the water 
management role to the lowest levels of catchment and sub-catchment councils. 
Management problems within the forest sector have revolved around the need to maintain a vibrant 
plantation-based industry that employed about 14 000 people in 2002 and meet the needs of local 
people, the majority of whom reside in communal areas. As a result emphasis has tended to fall on 
the need to avoid deforestation and degradation of the forest resources as this would have a negative 
impact on the industry. In communal areas, where about 43% of the country’s forests are located, 
the use of forests is controlled by the Communal Lands Forestry Act of 1975. This Act allows 
people in communal areas to make use of their forests for everyday needs such as grazing and 
forest-products. The act does not however allow for commercialisation of forest products in the 
communal areas. The Forest Department is in charge of all gazetted forest areas and the emphasis is 
on reducing deforestation and degradation of forests. With the land reforms the Forest Department 
has not adequately supervised most these areas as they have fallen victim to clearance for 
agricultural land and fuel-wood.  
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4 Towards TBNRM in the inshore fishery of Lake Kariba 
Different management systems have operated on both shorelines since artisanal fishing commenced. 
The Zambian fishing policy is to maximise fish production for the purposes of meeting the food 
requirement of urban workers and to ensure employment in the rural areas. Consequently, 
fishermen are allowed to own as many nets as they can afford and entry is almost free. On the 
Zimbabwean shoreline, certain parts of the lake are closed to fishing to protect the interests of the 
tourist industry. Furthermore, the NPWA has an effective management unit organised along semi-
military lines to make certain that fishing regulations are adhered to. While these different 
management systems are not necessarily a problem in the rest of the fishery, conflicts arise in the 
narrow parts of the fishery such as the Mlibizi Basin.  
Fishing regulations 
The different fishing regulations have been a major source of conflict in the basin. Fishing 
regulations on the Zambian shoreline do not place any limit to the number of nets a fishermen can 
own. Furthermore, the minimum mesh-size allowed is much smaller than that allowed on the 
Zimbabwean side of the lake. Survey figures indicate that in 1990 there were 140 Zambian artisanal 
fishermen operating in the basin while the Zimbabwean figure was 120 (ZZSFP 1998b). These 
Zambian fishermen owned 132 boats of various kinds and had a total of almost 2 000 gill-nets 
compared to 79 boats and 240 nets for the Zimbabweans (ZZSFP 1998b). Another survey revealed 
that the number of Zambian fishermen had increased to 613 while on the Zimbabwean side there 
had been a decline to only 63 (ZZSFP 1999). During the same period the number of gill-nets owned 
by the Zambians almost trebled to 3 069 compared to the 1990 figures. There was also an increase 
in the number of nets recorded on the Zimbabwean side despite a decrease in the number of 
fishermen. In 1995 the number of Zambian fishermen in the basin declined significantly to 225 
(Chitembure 1996; Jul-Larsen 2003). This decline was attributed to new fishing and settlement 
regulations that were brought about through the introduction of the fisheries co-management project 
(Malasha 2003).  
By 1998, however, the number had again increased to 400 while on the Zimbabwean side it was 
216. During the same period the Zimbabwean fishermen had about 687 nets (Songore 2000; ZZSFP 
1999). The figures presented above clearly show that Zambian fishermen exert more effort and 
hence catch more fish in the basin than their Zimbabwean counterparts. Not only are Zambian entry 
rules easier than those of the Zimbabweans, the fishermen are also allowed to have more nets with 
smaller mesh-sizes. This means that that their capacity to catch fish is far higher than that of 
Zimbabweans. These discrepancies have been a major cause of the current conflicts. 
Fishing grounds  
When Lake Kariba came into being, different land tenure systems applied to the shoreline. On the 
Zambian side of the lake, the land was classified as ‘native reserve area’. This classification allowed 
the then Gwembe Tonga Native Authority (GTNA) to be consulted whenever changes to the land 
tenure system were to be made. As the water levels began to rise it was realised that there would not 
be sufficient agricultural land on which to resettle most of the displaced people. The GTNA decreed 
that due to these problems most of the local people would have to take up fishing. Consequently, 
the entire shoreline was open to allow the local population to take up artisanal fishing. This policy 
has remained intact since the 1950s. As the water levels began to rise on the Zimbabwean shoreline, 
the reservoir was designated as a recreational park. In addition, the authorities created safari areas 
and national parks, all of which had the lake as their frontage. Artisanal fishing in waters adjacent to 
the Chete Safari Area, most of the Matusadona National Park and parts of the Charara Safari Area is 
not allowed. Other restrictions are in place for river mouths, large population centres, harbours, and 
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river estuaries. At present about 470km2 (63%) of the fishable water on the Zimbabwean side is 
available to the inshore fishery while the rest is closed (Marshall et al. 1982).  
This situation has led to a number of conflicts in the Mlibizi Basin. Zimbabwean artisanal fishermen 
have been encroaching on the closed grounds in search of better catches. This leads them into direct 
confrontation with the NPWA and the safari operators. The artisanal fishermen are accused of 
targeting the tigerfish population, leading to a decline in the quality of sport-fishing which attracts a 
lot of tourists (ZZSFP 1996). The authorities have responded by taking a heavy-handed approach to 
control this illegal fishing. Zimbabwean artisanal fishermen caught fishing in closed areas have 
their fishing equipment seized and their boats sunk. Similarly, Zambian fishermen found fishing on 
the Zimbabwean side of the border receive the same treatment from security agents. The small-
meshed gill-nets, in particular, used by Zambian fishers, are perceived to be very harmful to the 
sport-fishing species targeted by tourists. 
Fish marketing  
The Zambian part of the Mlibizi Basin is isolated from the major consumer areas. The nearest town 
Lusaka is more than 200km away from the fishery. The state of the road infrastructure is such that 
during the rainy season the roads become impassable. The nearest alternative market for Zambian 
fishermen is in Binga on the Zimbabwean shoreline. It is also in this town the Zambian fishermen 
obtain most of their essential commodities. The major constraint at the moment is that Zambian 
fishers land their fish on the Binga market informally. An informal network of Zimbabwean 
security officials buy the fish from Zambian fishermen at a lower price than is charged by 
Zimbabwean fishers. The justification is that Zambian fishers receive protection from penalties for 
entering the country illegally. The fact that Zambian fishers own more nets and nets with smaller 
mesh than their Zimbabwean counterparts and that they are not subject to standard controls on the 
price of fish has given rise to conflict. Catches go bad as Zimbabwean fishermen are not able to 
compete with their Zambian counterparts.  
Table 1: Management of Lake Kariba 
 Regulation 
enforcement 
Fish prices Fishing nets Fishing grounds Entry 
requirements 
Zambia Lack of capacity to 
enforce 
regulations. No 
specific unit within 
DoF dealing with 
enforcement.ZMCs 




No limit on the 
number of nets. 
The legal 
minimum mesh 
size is 76mm of 
stretched mesh. 
Allowed to fish 
anywhere. Can 
also engage in 
other agricultural 
activities on the 
lake shore. 
Entry into fishery 
is in principle 
free, but fishers 
must operate 
from designated 
fishing camps.  












number of nets 
allowed is five. 
Legal minimum 
mesh size is 
100mm of 












NPWA and local 
authority. 
 
Designing a framework for the basin 
There is already a legal framework which could form the basis for the creation of a TBNRM to 
resolve the conflicts in the Mlibizi Basin. Zambia and Zimbabwe are signatories to the SADC treaty 
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which defines the basis for regional integration and co-operation in the management of shared 
resources. The two countries are already implementing a joint-management initiative known as 
Zimbabwe Mozambique and Zambia Transboundary Natural Resources Management Project 
(Zimoza). The two countries are also signatories to a number of protocols such as the SADC 
Wildlife Policy, the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement and the 
revised SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses. Furthermore, the two countries signed the 
Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZWC) that came into force in 2003. Apart from being a 
mechanism through which conflicts can be settled, the ZWC also seeks to foster among the 
inhabitants of the Zambezi watercourse, of which Lake Kariba is a part, greater awareness of the 
equitable and reasonable utilisation and the efficient management and development of the resources 
of the Zambezi River (Munjoma 2004:1–8).  
At national level, Zambia and Zimbabwe have policies that seek to devolve the management of 
natural resources to users. In the early 1990s this philosophy was transferred to Lake Kariba where 
both countries instituted fisheries co-management arrangements. During this process a protocol was 
signed on Economic and Technical Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of 
Zambia and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe concerning the management and 
development of fisheries on Lake Kariba and transboundary waters on the Zambezi River. It forms 
the legal basis for the joint Zambia/ Zimbabwe institution for the management of the lake. Within 
the protocol the Zambia/ Zimbabwe Joint Permanent Commission (ZZJPC) represents the highest 
level of political liaison. Issues related to fishing are conducted under the auspices of the Joint 
Fisheries Technical Committee (JFTC) composed of members from DoF in Zambia and the NPWA 
in Zimbabwe. Although the mandate of the JFTC is to be responsible for all fishery matters related 
to Lake Kariba, this has mainly been confined to the allocation of harvesting quotas for the Kapenta 
industry. Artisanal fishermen are currently not represented on the JFTC. 
The most pertinent question at the moment is why these legal frameworks have not led to the 
creation of a TBNRM in the Mlibizi Basin, given the numerous conflicts which exist. Firstly, the 
manner in which the management of the fishery emerged and is being implemented gives the 
impression that fishers from either country are competing against each other. This view is 
engendered by the fact that the fishing regulations are seen as giving Zambian fishers an undue 
advantage. State security agents exacerbate this animosity by taking a heavy-handed approach in the 
name of controlling over-exploitation of the fishery when in essence they are actually protecting the 
interests of other economic actors such as the tourist sector.  
Secondly, the fishermen from either shoreline do not realise that they utilise a common ecosystem 
and that it is only through co-operation that the conflicts can be resolved. The institutionalisation of 
co-management arrangements in the early 1990s on both shorelines presented an opportunity to 
address how the Mlibizi Basin is utilised. This opportunity was lost because the co-management 
arrangements on both sides of the border were not extended to include cross-border co-operation 
with similar institutions. Instead, the ZMCs on the Zambian side address issues related to the 
Zambian side of the fishery while the sub-area fishers’ associations (SAFAs) concentrate only on 
matters related to the Zimbabwean side. Furthermore, issues related to artisanal fishing are not 
usually on the agenda of the JFTC. The various protocols have been used to create an enabling 
environment for fishers to begin to seek holistic solutions to the problems they face in this shared 
ecosystem.  
Thirdly, there is lack of official recognition of the need for a TBNRM in the basin because of the 
perceived low economic value attributed to artisanal fishing. A review of the current TBNRM 
arrangements indicate that one of the major objectives for their formation is economic, especially as 
a result of increased tourist revenues (Katerere et al. 2003). As a result, the TBNRMs have attracted 
actors from business, international conservation NGOs and local governments. In contrast artisanal 
fishing is largely for subsistence with few benefits accruing to national and local governments and 
other influential actors. In the case of Lake Kariba, artisanal fishing is not even on the agenda of the 
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ZZJPC whose broad objective is for the ‘management and development of fisheries on Lake Kariba 
and transboundary waters on the Zambezi River’. 
Finally, and related to the above, artisanal fishing in the Lake Kariba fishery is regarded as a low 
priority compared to other activities such as Kapenta fishing. It is estimated that in the 1980s the 
Kapenta industry employed more than 5 000 people in Zambia and Zimbabwe. On the Zimbabwean 
shoreline the Kapenta industry accounts for about 93% of wet fish landed and most of the 
infrastructure on that side of the shoreline has been built for this fishery (Bourdillon et al. 1985). 
Apart from employment opportunities, the industry is a major source of revenue for local and 
licensing authorities.  
Given the above, the challenge for CBNRM and TBNRM practitioners is to find an agent that can 
stimulate co-operation between artisanal fishers in the basin. Examples from the wildlife sector, 
where TBNRM arrangements have been implemented over a number of years, show that the role of 
a ‘stimulant’ has been played by a number of local and foreign actors with diverse interests. 
Conservation groups from the north, donor agencies, local governments and even academic 
institutions have all been instrumental in the promotion of TBNRM within the wildlife sector 
(Katerere et al. 2001). In comparison, similar institutions and attention is missing when it comes to 
artisanal fishing. The primary reason is that from an economic point of view artisanal fishing does 
not attract the attention of the various actors such as conservation groups, donor agencies and even 
local governments. This is in spite of increasing evidence of the vital role that artisanal fishing plays 
in the livelihoods of the majority of vulnerable households, as has been shown in the southern 
African region (Jul-Larsen 2003; Béné 2004). In the absence of an agency that promotes the role of 
artisanal fishing and the need for TBNRM, the resolution of the conflicts in the basin will take 
much longer. 
Creation of a commons 
Despite these challenges, from a practical point of view it is only through the designation of a part 
of the basin as a ‘commons’ that the conflicts can best be solved, while at the same time protecting 
the interests of other more economically influential fishery actors. This commons will have to take 
into consideration the organisational capacity of fishers. For it to operate effectively, the commons 
will have to be legally recognised within the context of the JFTC. This will enable fishers from both 
countries to begin to address the various issues which have been a source of conflict. These include 
the number of nets each fisher may possess and the minimum size of nets that can be employed. A 
quota system may also have to be introduced, given that there are more Zambian fishers. 
In terms of institutional arrangements, a stakeholder forum comprising of the ZMCs and SAFAs, 
the local authorities, the Kapenta fishermen, the tourist sector and other representatives of the 
various economic interests in this part of the lake, should be part of the already existing Joint 
Fisheries Technical Committee of the ZZJPC. This forum will provide a platform from which issues 
related to the way the commons will be used, can be addressed. Other pertinent issues which have 
led to conflict and which require attention, include fish-marketing and pricing arrangements, 
security concerns, and cross-border movements.  
Studies conducted in the freshwater fisheries of southern Africa suggest that the creation of such a 
commons would serve a number of purposes for thousands of households (Jul-Larsen 2003). Firstly, 
in the Mlibizi Basin itself this would reduce a conflict that has led to fatalities when artisanal fishers 
target the same species in a jointly-accessed ecosystem. Secondly, the commons would serve as a 
vital safety-valve for thousands of people who lose their livelihoods in other sectors. It would 
cushion households from falling further into poverty as a result of loss of employment in other 
sectors, or due to low agricultural productivity in a region that is prone to droughts. Thirdly, owing 
to the existing co-management institutions on either shoreline, the management of such a commons 
would not be prohibitive as is the case in other TBNRM arrangements that have spawned several 
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layers of bureaucratic instruments. The proposed stakeholder forum would be a sufficient vehicle 
through which to manage the commons. 
Opposition to such a commons would inevitably come from other actors, especially the tourism 
sector. However, recent research has indicated that the type of technology used by artisanal 
fishermen in Lake Kariba does not have the potential to over-exploit the resource base and threaten 
the activities of other actors. Furthermore, the closing-off of certain parts of the fishery to protect 
the spawning ground of sport-fishing species such as the tigerfish, as is the current situation on the 
Zimbabwean shoreline, does not have much biological justification (Jul-Larsen 2003). Even within 
the NPWA there is debate on the relevance of closing-off certain areas to artisanal fishing (ZZFSP 
1998a). Such factors would be sufficient grounds to obtain official support for the creation of a 
commons in the Mlibizi Basin. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
This paper set out to propose a TBNRM framework for the Mlibizi Basin of the Lake Kariba 
fishery. It was observed that both Zambia and Zimbabwe have embraced the concept of CBNRM 
and TBNRM, which forms the basis for the joint management of this fishery. These factors set the 
stage upon which to develop a TBNRM framework for the basin. At the same time it was observed 
that a number of challenges related to artisanal fishing and other similar resources will have to be 
addressed if this arrangement is to succeed. It was noted that most of the CBNRM and TBNRM 
initiatives have tended to focus on those resources that attract national and global attention, such as 
wildlife. Low-economic value resources such as artisanal fishing have not been accorded the same 
priority. It is this point that forms another challenge to the theory and practice of CBNRM and 
TBNRM. They are premised on the understanding that the resources to be conserved will more than 
pay for themselves through extensive use of the market. In the case of TBNRM the market is the 
global tourist market. The discourse does not address how TBNRM can be achieved in resources 
that do not attract global or even national interest. It is postulated that the joint management of such 
resources will largely remain at a rhetorical level only. The second challenge is the biological 
dynamics and how they relate to the operation of the institutions that would have been created for 
TBNRM. In the case of Lake Kariba, the biological cycles influence the entry and departure of 
fishermen into the fishery.  
The paper has suggested that a solution to the problem would be through the creation of a commons 
in the basin. This commons would have to take cognisance of the interests of other actors, and of 
the administrative abilities of the fishers themselves. Although there may be opposition to the 
formation of such a commons, such opposition would largely be based on data that does not justify 
the manner in which the fishery is currently managed. It is argued that the gear used by artisanal 
fishermen and the role that the fishery plays in poverty alleviation would more than justify the need 
for the creation of a common fishing ground for fishers from the two countries.  
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